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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STANDING - SEPARATION OF POWERS - The
Supreme Court of the United States refused to rule on whether the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996 violated the Constitutional separation of
powers by impermissibly delegating legislative powers to the
President because the Congressmen who brought the suit did not
have standing to maintain the action.
Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
The 104th Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act' ("LIVA7) in
March 1996.2 LIVA was presented to the President as required by
the United States Constitution.3 The President duly signed the bill
into law in April 1996.4 LIVA took effect on January 1, 1997.5 LIVA's
goal was reduction of the United States' budget deficit. 6
Generally, LIVA permitted the President to modify a bill by
striking fiscal provisions that he deemed inappropriate,7 effecting a
1. 2 U.S.C. §691. The Line Item Veto Act provides, in part:
a) In general
Notwithstanding the provision of subchapters I and II of this chapter, and subject to
the provisions of this subchapter, the President may, with respect to any bill or joint
resolution that has been signed into law pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the
Constitution of the United States, cancel in whole -
(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority;
(2) any item of new direct spending; or
(3) any limited tax benefit;
if the President -
(A) determines that such cancellation will -
(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit;
(ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and
(iii) not harm the national interest; and
(B) notifies the Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special
message, in accordance with section 691a of this title, within five
calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law
providing the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, item of
new direct spending, or limited tax benefit that was canceled.
2 U.S.C. §691(a) (1996).
2. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct 2314 (1997).
3. Article I, section §7, clause 2 of the Constitution provides: "Every Bill which shall
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States. If he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he
shall return it, with his Objections to the house in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it." Id.
4. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2315.
5. Id.
6. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C. 1997).
7. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2315. LIVA is not a "veto" in the ordinary sense of that term,
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"cancellation" of those provisions.8 Under LIVA, the President could
cancel three types of provisions: (1) any discretionary item
affecting budgetary authority;9  (2) any item of new direct
spending; 10 or (3) any limited tax benefit." LIVA did impose some
limits on presidential Line Item Veto power, however. Before
striking an appropriation, LIVA required the President to certify
that his action would: result in a reduction of the budget deficit;
2
not hinder necessary Government functions; 13 and not jeopardize
national interests. 4 After certification, LIVA required the President
to issue a "special message,"8 notifying Congress of his intention to
cancel an appropriated item.'8
Six members of the 104th Congress challenged LIVA in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,1
7
contending that LIVA violated the "presentment clause" (Article I,
section 7) of the United States Constitution. 8 The Congressmen
the Act authorizes cancellation of provisions after the President signs the bill. Id.
8. Id.
9. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(1).
10. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(2).
11. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(3).
12. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(1)(A)(i).
13. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(1)(A)(ii).
14. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(1)(A)(iii).
15. 2 U.S.C. §691a(A). LIVA provides that the "special message" must contain:
(A) the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, item of new direct spending,
or limited tax benefit which has been canceled, and provide a corresponding
reference number for each cancellation;
(B) the determinations required under section 691(a) of this title, together with any
supporting material;
(C) the reasons for the cancellation;
(D) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary
effect of the cancellation;
(E) all facts, circumstances and considerations relating to or bearing upon the
cancellation, and to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated effect of the
cancellation upon the objects, purposes and programs for which the canceled
authority was provided; and
(F) include the adjustments that will be made pursuant to section 691c of this title to
the discretionary spending limits under section 665 of this title and an evaluation of
the effects of those adjustments upon the sequestration procedures of section 901 of
this title.
2 U.S.C. §691a(b)(1)(A)-(F).
16. 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(1)(B).
17. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2315. The six members of Congress who joined in the suit
were: Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.V.), Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(D-N.Y), Sen. Mark Hatfield (D-Wash.), Rep. David Skaggs D-Colo.) and Rep. Henry Waxman
(D-Cal.). Id. All but Senator Hatfield, who retired, remain members of the 105th Congress.
Id. at n.1. The Court found its jurisdiction under 2 U.S.C. section 692. Id. n.1.
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text
Raines v. Byrd
claimed that LIVA violated their rights as legislators under the
Constitution in three separate and distinct ways.19 First, the
President's application of LIVA could transform an otherwise
acceptable bill into a bill for which they would not have voted.20
Second, LIVA impermissibly authorized the President to assume the
Congressional prerogative to repeal legislation.2' Third, LIVA upset
the constitutionally mandated balance of power between Congress
and the President.22
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
agreed with the Congressmen, ruling that LIVA was an
unconstitutional violation of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.23 The
district court decided the case on the merits after determining that
the Congressmen had standing to contest LIVA,24 their claim was
ripe,25 and any separation of powers issue between the judiciary
and the legislature was expressly resolved.
26
On the question of standing, the district court, without much
explanation, ruled that LIVA lessened the effect of the
Congressmen's votes, thus, injuring them in a manner sufficient to
present a "case or controversy" as required by Article III of the
19. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2316. The Congressmen claimed that the Line Item Veto Act
constitutes a "direct and concrete" injury to them in their role as representatives. Id. (citing




23. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F Supp. 25, 35, (D.D.C., 1997). The Court stated, "The
President's cancellation of an item unilaterally effects a repeal of statutory law such that the
bill he signed is not the law that will govern the Nation. That is precisely what the
Presentment Clause was designed to prevent." Id.
24. Byrd, 956 F Supp. at 30-31. "Standing" is defined as having a "sufficient stake in
an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1405-06 (6th ed. 1990).
The court applied the following standard, "Plaintiffs must allege. . . (1) an injury personal
to them, (2) that has actually been inflicted by defendants or is certainly impending, and (3)
that is redressable by judicial decree." Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 30-31 (citing Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
25. Byrd, 956 E Supp. at 31-33. A claim is "ripe" if it is the subject of "an actual,
present controversy." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1328 (6th ed. 1991). The district court held:
"Because plaintiffs now find themselves in a position of unanticipated and unwelcome
subservience to the President before and after they vote on appropriations bills, Article III is
satisfied, and this Court may accede to Congress' directive to address the constitutional
cloud over the act as swiftly as possible." Byrd, 956 F Supp. at 31-33.
26. Id. at 33. The defendants claimed that the district court should "exercise [its]
equitable discretion to dismiss the complaint because of separation of powers concerns." Id.
However, Congress provided for expedited review in 2 U.S.C. §692. The district court
determined that this settled the matter. Id.
1998
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Constitution.2 7 The district court cited precedent of the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in its decision.
28
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed,2 9 holding that
the Congressmen lacked standing.30 The Court vacated the decision
of the district court and remanded for dismissal of the complaint.
31
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted Allen V.
Wright's 2 test for Article I standing, which requires the plaintiff to
"allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested
relief "33 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife's requirement that
plaintiffs have a "personal stake" in the actionM The Court
explained that Lujan also requires the alleged legal wrong be
"particular" to the plaintiff.35 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted
Fast v. Cohen's36 holding that a claim is judicially cognizable only
if it is capable of judicial settlement.
37
Under Article Ill, standing requirements are stringent,3 but the
Court found that this standard rises even higher when a dispute
between the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government is presented to the courts. 39 The Chief Justice
cautioned the judiciary to resist the "natural urge" to decide a case
on its merits when the challenging party has failed to show that it
has met the threshold requirements of standing.40
27. U.S. CONST. Art. III, §2.
28. Byrd, 956 F Supp. at 30. The court pointed to precedent established by the D.C.
Circuit regarding standing for members of Congress. See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F3d 623,
625 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Moore v. United States House of Representatives 733 F2d 946, 950-53
(D.C. Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166,
1168-71 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). Id.
29. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2316. The Court stated that it did not approved of the D.C.
Circuit's cases permitting legislative standing. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
33. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
34. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The "personal
stake" language in Lujan was taken from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
35. Id.
36. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
37. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317. A "judicially cognizable action" is one "traditionally
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
38. Id. at 2317-18.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2318. The Court's task is to stay within its constitutional boundaries, often
requiring the Court to refuse to decide a case on the merits because the party seeking relief
is not properly before it. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
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The issue before the Court was whether an alleged reduction of
political power is sufficient to confer standing on Congressmen to
contest the constitutionality of an act.41 Answering this question in
the negative, Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the alleged
injury, "loss of political power," from cases involving Congressmen
who lost a "private right" through some act of Congress.
42
Furthermore, the Court distinguished the instant case from
Coleman v. Miller,43 which found that legislators had standing.44 In
Coleman, the Supreme Court ruled that twenty Kansas state
legislators may have had their votes rendered completely invalid by
a tie-breaking vote cast by the Lieutenant Governor.45 The Court
distinguished Coleman, finding that the Raines Congressmen
merely suffered a potentially diminished vote.
46
The Chief Justice reviewed historical incidents to show that a
potential action is not one that has traditionally conferred Article
III standing.47 However, most of these incidents did not result in
judicial challenges by the potentially injured officials.
48
Following the Court's finding that the Congressmen lacked
minimum requirements of standing.
41. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared this a question of first impression, stating, "We
have never had occasion to rule on the question of legislative standing presented here." Id.
42. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318. Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed Powell v. McCormick,
395 U.S. 486 (1969), stating, "In [Powell], we held that a Member of Congress' constitutional
challenge to his exclusion from the House of Representatives (and his consequent loss of
salary) presented an Article HI case or controversy." Id.
43. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
44. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-20.
45. Id. at 2319.
46. Id. at 2320. Under LIVA, if the President cancels a provision of an appropriations
bills, Congress can then pass the canceled provision in a separate bill. Id.
47. Id. at 2321-22. Chief Justice Rehnquist further determined that the weight of
precedent opposed the Congressmen in this case. Id. Similar cases were not challenged,
presumably because it was understood by the potential challengers that standing did not
exist. Id.
For instance, the Tenure in Office Act was not challenged by any President who was
subject to it (e.g.., Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, or Grover Cleveland). Raines, 117 S.
Ct. at 2321. After the Tenure in Office Act was substantially repealed by Congress, the
remainder became the subject of a suit and was ruled unconstitutional. Id. However, this
suit was not brought by a President. Id. Similarly, President Gerald Ford did not file a suit to
challenge certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act that were ultimately ruled
unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Id. at 2322.
In the same vein, Congressmen did not challenge the Pocket Veto during President
Coolidge's tenure. Id. The Chief Justice also explained that if the Congressmen were found
to have standing in this case, the ruling would contradict the Court's holding in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha held that the Attorney General had standing to
challenge the one-House veto provision because it rendered his authority provisional rather
than final. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932.
48. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2321-22.
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standing, the Court identified two ways in which the Congressmen
could avoid the alleged effects of LIVA 49 (1) by Congressional
action (repealing LIVA or by including a provision that expressly
excludes a bill from presidential action under LIVA); 5° or (2) private
action by an individual alleging injury because of a presidentially
canceled provision.51
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment, finding that the Court would have an
opportunity to pass judgment on the Line Item Veto Act in a suit
brought by a private plaintiff.52 Justice Souter added that a private
suit by a plaintiff directly deprived of some benefit by the
President's cancellation of an appropriation would meet the
standing requirements.5
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer wrote separate dissenting
opinions. Justice Stevens reasoned that the Line Item Veto Act, as
passed, could result in the enactment of a law that Congress never
approved, 54 denying the legislature the opportunity to vote on
appropriations bills altered by the President.o If this occurred,
legislators would suffer a concrete and particularized injury.5
Justice Stevens would have held that LIVA is unconstitutional.
57
Justice Breyer did not discuss the merits of the case but simply
expressed his belief that the Congressmen presented a real dispute
that the Court should have decided on its merits.58 He noted that
nothing in the Constitution differentiates between "personal harm"
and "official harm."59 Finally, Justice Breyer stated his belief that, in
the instant case, the Court could have redressed the alleged harm,
49. Id. at 2322. The Court ruled, "Our conclusion neither deprives Members of
Congress an adequate remedy.., nor forecloses the Act from constitutional challenge." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2323-25 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter reasoned, "The virtue of
waiting for a private suit is only confirmed by the certainty that another suit can come to
us." Id. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring).
53. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2325-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found, "The Line Item Veto
Act establishes a mechanism by which bills passed by both Houses of Congress will
eventually produce laws that have not passed either House of Congress and that have not
been voted on by any other Senator or Representative." Id. at 2326.
55. Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. Justice Stevens analogized the legislators' alleged diluted votes in this case to
Baker v. Carr's holding that an individual whose vote was found to be diluted had an
interest sufficient to confer standing. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962)).
57. Id. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2327-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2328 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Vol. 36:961
Raines v. Byrd
whereas in Coleman v. Miller, the issue was effectively moot
because ratification of the Child Labor Amendment by Kansas had
no real effect.6° Standing is a doctrine of judicial restraint that
arises under Article III of the Constitution.61 The doctrine
recognizes the judiciary's limitations under the Constitution, a
necessary restraint in a democracy.62 However, no exact criteria are
set forth under the Constitution to determine whether a particular
party has standing.63  Commentators have observed that the
Supreme Court invokes standing when it wishes to avoid deciding
difficult cases on the merits.6
The Supreme Court defined "standing" in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.65 Under this three-part test, a plaintiff must allege an
injury that is: "concrete and particularized"; "actual and imminent";
and causally connected to the alleged wrongful conduct.6 In
addition, the injury must be one for which a court can provide a
remedy.
67
In Lujan, the Defenders of Wildlife68 challenged the Secretary of
the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA). 69 The ESA sought to protect endangered species by
restricting federal funds for projects that negatively affected the
endangered wildlife.70 The Secretary of the Interior interpreted the
ESA to apply only to projects "in the United States or on the high
seas."71 However, a prior regulation interpreted the ESA to apply to
projects receiving federal funding, no matter where the project was
located.72
Two such projects were at issue in Lujan: in Egypt and Sri
Lanka. 73 The Defenders of Wildlife claimed that Congress had
earmarked federal funds for the projects that would negatively
60. Id. Twenty-six states had already rejected the Amendment, thus it had no chance
for ratification. Id.
61. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
62. Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
63. Id. at 751.
64. JoHN E. NowAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTIUTIONAL LAw 84 (5th ed. 1995).
65. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 559. The "Defenders of Wildlife" were a group of organizations that sought
to protect both wildlife and the environment. Id.
69. Id. at 557-58. The ESA is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. Id. at 558.
70. Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
71. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59.
72. Id. at 558.
73. Id.
1998 967
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impact the natural habitats of certain endangered species.7 4 The
plaintiffs alleged that this caused an injury to those persons who
wished to view the wildlife in its natural habitat.75 However, none
of the Defenders of Wildlife had ever witnessed the endangered
species in its natural habitats at the sites of the respective
projects.76 Nor did the plaintiffs have any immediate plans to travel
to the sites where the endangered animals were located. 77
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that the alleged
injury was not imminent, since the plaintiffs had no definite plans
to view the wildlife at the respective sites.7 8 In addition, the
Defenders of Wildlife failed to present a claim that the Court could
remedy.79 Justice Scalia pointed out two factors weighing against
judicial redressibility. First, the Secretary of the Interior's
regulations might not be binding.8° Second, the plaintiffs did not
allege that the Department of the Interior would abandon the
projects if federal funds were not appropriated.81
The Court also rejected the idea of "citizen standing,"8 2 which
Congress apparently authorized under the ESA.ss Justice Scalia held
that it is not the Court's role to redress general harms to society,84
but only includes disputes concerning harm to individuals.85 He
found that the legislative and the executive branches of government
should redress general complaints about society's ills.8 6
74. Id. at 563.
75. Id. An affidavit by Defender of Wildlife, Joyce Kelly, alleged that she hoped to visit
Egypt where she hoped to see the Nile crocodile in its natural habitat. Id. In addition,
Defender of Wildlife, Amy Skilbred, hoped to travel to Sri Lanka where she hoped to see
certain endangered species in their natural habitat. Id.
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 568-70.
80. Id. at 570.
81. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571. Justice Scalia stated, "Respondents have produced nothing
to indicate that the projects they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to
listed species, if [federal funds are] eliminated." Id.
82. Id. at 576 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990)).
83. Id. at 576-77. The ESA granted citizen standing to: "[A]ny person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter." Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
84. Id. at 576.
85. Id. Justice Scalia quoted Marbury v. Madison's admonition to future Courts: "The
province of the Court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals." Id. (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 170 (1803)).
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. Justice Scalia reasoned that "[vlindicating the public
interest... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive." Id.
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Prior to its decision in Lujan, the Supreme Court held in Allen v.
Wright that the federal tax-exempt status of private schools does
not interfere with the right of black children to attend racially
integrated schools.87  Although the plaintiffs claimed that the
exemptions had hindered racial desegregation,8s the exemptions did
not deny the complaining parties private school enrollment. 9 Thus,
the Court held that the plaintiff-parents and their children did not
suffer a personal injury that was causally connected to the alleged
wrongful conduct by the government9
Underlying the Allen decision was the interpretation of
"separation of powers."91 The Court ruled that the plight of the
black parents and schoolchildren was best left to elected officials.92
Article HI of the Constitution authorizes the federal courts to
decide "cases or controversies."93 Thus, courts must restrain
themselves from overreaching and have done so by developing
doctrines such as standing.4 Judge Bork found that the Framers
included these Article LI doctrines to impose limits upon the
unelected branch of the federal government.95
In reading the Lujan and Allen cases, one gains a good overview
of the principles underlying the doctrine of standing. Only with this
overview in mind, can one understand the Court's rationale in
Raines v. Byrd, which presented the interesting issue of whether
the Supreme Court should recognize the concept of legislator
standing.9 6  In the wake of Raines, this question remains
unresolved.
97
In Raines, the Congressmen challenging LIVA relied heavily on
87. Alen, 486 U.S. at 739-740. Private schools were awarded tax-exempt status if they
practiced a policy of non-discrimination. Id. at 740 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§501(a), 501(c)(5),
170(a)(1) and 170(c)(2)).
88. Id. at 745.
89. Id. at 746.
90. Id. at 766.
91. Id. at 750-52.
92. Allen, 486 U.S. at 761.
93. Id. at 750.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 750 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Bork, J., concurring)). Judge Bork reasoned, "All of the doctrines that cluster about Article
II-not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political questions, and the like - relate in
part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition
but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to
the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our dnd of government." Id.
96. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F2d 190, 205 (D.C. Circuit 1976).
97. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court's rationale in Coleman v. Miller,98 in which the
Court hypothesized that a bloc of legislators whose votes were
nullified would have a sufficient interest to confer standing.99
However, a majority of the Court did not adopt this statement and,
therefore, the Coleman hypothesis is mere dictum with no
precedential value.10
The Supreme Court has given no express guidance on legislator
standing, but the concept has had a turbulent history in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 0' In Kennedy
v. Sampson, the D.C. Circuit recognized legislator standing. 1°2
However, it is unclear what conditions must be satisfied for a
legislator to establish that he has standing to sue.1 3
In Kennedy, Senator Edward Kennedy challenged the validity of
a presidential pocket veto.' 4 The bill that the President did not
veto, but refused to sign, was presented to him eight days prior to
Congress' Christmas recess. 0 5 During the brief recess, the President
informed the Senate, by memorandum, of his decision not to
execute the bill1°6 Thus, by virtue of Article I, Section 7, the bill
failed to become law, and was not subject to Congressional
override. 0
98. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
99. Id. at 438.
100. Id. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Coleman, four Justices concurred in
the judgment but believed that the state legislators lacked standing. Id. Justice Butler and
Justice McReynolds dissented. Justice Butler stated, "The point that the question... is not
justifiable. . . was not raised by the parties or by the United States appearing as amicus
curiae." Id. at 470-74 (Butler, J., dissenting).
101. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Harrington v. Bush, 553
F2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 E2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Moore v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F2d
561 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Michel v. Anderson, 14 E3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Skaggs v. Carle, 110
F.3d 831 (1997).
102. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 433.
103. The D.C. Circuit recognized legislator standing in Kennedy, Goldwater, Riegle,
Vander Jagt, and Moore. However, legislator standing not found in Harrington and Skaggs.
104. Kennedy, 511 F2d at 432. A "pocket veto" results when Congress recesses after
sending a bill to the President, but before time expires for the President to take action by
either executing or vetoing the bill. BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY, 1155 (6th ed. 1991).
105. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432.
106. Id.
107. Id. Article I, section 7 provides, in relevant part: "If any bill shall not be returned
by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
their adjournment prevent its return in which case it shall not be a law." U.S. CONST. Art. I,
§7.
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Senator Kennedy claimed that this pocket veto rendered his vote
ineffective.'08 The circuit court agreed and concluded that the
pocket veto was invalid. 1°9 A necessary part of this decision was
the court's ruling that Senator Kennedy had standing to sue.10
The circuit court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Coleman v. Miller."' After reviewing Coleman, the Kennedy court
determined that the ability of legislators to seek judicial relief was
not limited to situations in which legislators sued as a bloc."2
Therefore, a single member of Congress can seek relief from the
judiciary if he or she shows a sufficient "personal stake" in the
dispute."3 The court held that the primary interest of a legislator is
the effectiveness of his vote. 1 4 Protecting this interest is sufficient
to confer standing on an individual legislator."
5
The court rejected the claim that Senator Kennedy, as an
individual member of Congress, had only an "indirect or derivative"
interest in the outcome of his suit." 6 The court reasoned that the
pocket veto hindered the role of Congress and, in turn, adversely
affected individual members of Congress." 7 Therefore, the circuit
court ruled that Senator Kennedy had standing because the pocket
veto nullified his vote."
8
108. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434. The court quoted Senator Kennedy's allegations: "The
acts of the defendants have injured the plaintiff as a United States Senator by denying him
the effectiveness of his vote as a member of the United States Senate. The plaintiff... was
among 64 Senators voting in favor of S. 3418.... ." Id.
109. Id. at 442.
110. Id. at 435. The court cited Baker v. Carr's test for standing. Id. (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). In Baker, the Supreme Court asked, "Have the appellants
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for the illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the
question of standing." Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). "A person's stake
can be satisfied if the plaintiff is merely 'among the injured.'" Id. at 435 (quoting Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
111. Id. at 434-35. The court quoted Coleman v. Miller "Here, the plaintiffs include
twenty senators, whose votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for
naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient
to defeat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest
in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes." Id. (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
438 (1939).
112. Id. at 435.
113. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 435 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
114. Id. at 436.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 435. The defense argued that legislators could not assert standing in their
official capacity. Id.
117. Id. at 436.
118. Kennedy, 511 F2d at 436.
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Two years after Kennedy, the D.C. Circuit held that
Representative Michael J. Harrington did not have standing to sue
the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")." 9  Representative
Harrington claimed that the CIA was involved in illegal activities.
1 20
He asked the court to declare certain CIA activities illegal.'12 In
addition, he sought a court order requiring the CIA to cease using
appropriated funds to conduct such activities.' 22 Representative
Harrington asserted that he had standing in separate causes of
action based on different grounds.' 23
In his first cause of action Harrington sought to have certain CIA
actions declared illegal, He asserted three potential interests to
support his claim of standing to sue.'2 First, he alleged that the
defendants faced possible impeachment charges if the CIA actions
were illegal. 25 In response, the court noted that the Harrington did
not allege that impeachment proceedings were certain to take place
if he were correct. 26 Second, he claimed that his ability to vote on
appropriations was hindered.127 Finally, he asserted that the court's
declaration would help him to determine what legislative action he
should take, if any.'2 Concerning the last two proffered interests,
the court noted that Representative Harrington did not definitely
assert that he would take any action if he obtained a favorable
ruling.12
In.his second cause of action, Harrington contended that he had
standing because the secret appropriations to the CIA prevented




123. Id. at 196. In seeking to have certain CIA activities declared illegal,
Representative Harrington relied on Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Id. In
seeking an injunction against using appropriated funds for illegal activities, Representative
Harrington relied on Kennedy. Id.
124. Harrington, 553 F2d at 197-200.
125. Id. at 198.
126. Id. The court found, "There is no allegation that a declaration of illegality would
force the Congress or appellant to commence impeachment proceedings, nor does it appear
that such a declaration as to past Agency activities would provide appellant with more basic
information than he already possesses." Id.
127. Id. at 199.
128. Id.
129. Harrington, 553 F2d at 199. The court found, "Appellant does not claim that a
declaration of illegality would cause him to take any legislative action whatsoever, rather,




him from casting an informed vote.130 The court responded that
Harrington did not claim loss of his power to vote.13' Harrington
also claimed standing because the CIA did not allow him to review
CIA accounting statements which "injured" his ability to debate the
matter with his colleagues. 32 The court noted that Harrington
received CIA reports. 1' Finally, Harrington asserted that the CIA's
"illegal" actions, made possible by public funding, "injured" him to
the extent that he voted in favor of the appropriations.' 4 In
response to these assertions, the court noted that illegal conduct by
a government agency does not injure a lawmaker 135 and that he did
not plead the "injury" resulting from his past votes with
specificity.'T M The court stated that "there are no special standards
for determining Congressional standing questions."3 7 The court
distinguished legislator votes already cast from votes yet to be cast
- the former confers standing, the latter does not.138
Two years later, the D.C. Circuit again faced the issue of standing
when it ruled that Senator Barry Goldwater and two other
Congressmen had standing to challenge President Carter's decision
to terminate a treaty with the Republic of China. 13 Goldwater's
challenge rested on two grounds.'14 First, that the United States
Constitution does not authorize the President to terminate
treaties.'4 ' Second, the treaty language authorized "the United
States," not "the President of the United States," to terminate the
treaty.
142
In finding that the Congressmen had standing to challenge
President' Carter's action, the court cited Warth v. Seldin 43 for the
premise that, in determining a party's standing, a court must accept
130. Id. at 202. CIA funds were diverted from the monies appropriated to several
other projects. Id. at 195.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 202-03. The court viewed this as an injury to the legislature, not the
legislator. Id. at 203.
133. Id. Representative Harrington thought that these reports were inadequate. Id.
134. Harrington, 553 F.2d at 203.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 204.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 211.
139. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
140. Id. at 701.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 701.
143. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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all allegations as true.'4 The court found that by accepting all
allegations as true, the President's action injured the Congressmen
because they lost their opportunity to vote on the termination of
the treaty.'4 In essence, the Congressmen did not have their vote
nufllied; Presidential action circumvented their opportunity to vote.
This court differentiated between instances in which Congressional
votes are circumvented by presidential action'4 (no opportunity to
cast a vote), 147 from instances where Congressmen believe that
their votes are ineffective.'" The former instance confers standing,
but the latter does not.49
During the period 1981-1984, the D.C. Circuit heard several cases
that addressed legislator standing.'10 In these cases, the court found
that the challenging legislators had standing to bring suit to redress
alleged harms.151 However, in each case, the court dismissed the
claims under the doctrine of "equitable discretion." 52
The first of the cases invoking the doctrine of "equitable
discretion" was Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. In Riegle, the
D.C. Circuit determined that Senator Donald Riegle had standing to
bring a suit challenging the Federal Reserve Act.'5 Senator Riegle
claimed that the act was unconstitutional because it allowed
appointment of members of the Federal Open Market Committee
("FOMC") without Senate confirmation. 15 The court acknowledged
that its prior decisions on the question of legislative standing were
confusing. 15'
The court found that traditional standing analysis was insufficient
144. Goldwater, 617 F2d at 701-02 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).




149. Goldwater, 617 F2d at 701.
150. See supra note 103.
151. See generally Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 E2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Moore v. United States House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
152. "Equitable discretion" is a doctrine espoused by The Honorable Carl McGowan.
See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L REv. 241 (1981).
153. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 879.
154. Id. at 877. Senator Riegle sought an injunction which would bar the five FOMC
members, who were not confirmed by the Senate, from voting on FOMC issues. Id. at 876.
155. Id. The court stated, "Two contradictory principles pervade the opinions of this
court concerning the standing of Congressional plaintiffs. First, no distinctions are to be
made between congressional and private plaintiffs in the standing analysis. . . [And],
[s]econd, this court will not confer standing on a congressional plaintiff unless he is
suffering an injury his colleagues cannot redress." Id. at 877.
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when a challenge by a legislator inferred a separation of powers
question.1' The court invoked its equitable discretion in dismissing
Senator Riegle's case because he had an adequate remedy within
the legislature. 5 7 The court explained that equitable discretion
requires dismissal of cases involving a legislator plaintiff if the
plaintiff lacked individual standing or could attempt to convince his
colleagues that they should act to redress his grievance.158 On the
other hand, equitable discretion holds the courts open to valid
claims by legislators in cases where private citizens lack standing
to sue and no adequate opportunity exists for the grievance to be
redressed by the legislature.159
The court followed the equitable discretion doctrine it espoused
in Riegle in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill&0 and Moore v. United States
House of Representatives.6' In each of these cases, the majority
rationale was strongly criticized in concurring opinions. 62 In each
case, the concurring justices would have held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue.' 63
In Vander Jagt, Republican representatives sued the Democratic
leadership of the House of Representatives, claiming that
assignment of committee seats in disproportion to the make-up of
the House diluted the importance of Republican votes.' 64 The court
determined that the allegations of vote dilution, First Amendment
violations, and tampering with House qualification standards were
sufficient to confer standing. 65 The court concluded that it could
grant relief to the challenging legislators, but the better course
would be to exercise equitable discretion and refuse to hear the
case. 166
156. Id. at 878 n.5 (citing McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15
GA_ L REV. 241, 244-45 (1981)).
157. Id. at 881-882. Apparently, the court used equitable discretion as an alternative to
standing since, in its view, the Supreme Court recognized that Senator Goldwater had
standing as a legislator in Goldwater v. Carter. Id. at 880 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979)).
158. Id. at 882.
159. Id.
160. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
161. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
162. In Vander Jagt, Judge Bork concurred in the dismissal of the case on the grounds
that the plaintiff lacked standing. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1185 (Bork, J., concurring). In
Moore, Judge Scalia concurred in the dismissal of the case but criticized the D.C. Circuit's
reliance on equitable discretion. Moore, 733 F.2d at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1185.
164. Id. at 1167.
165. Id. at 1168.
166. Id. at 1176. The court found that although a remedy was within its power, the
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Judge Bork concurred in the dismissal of the case.167 Using a
different rationale than the majority, Judge Bork would have
dismissed the case because the challenging Representatives lacked
standing.1 Judge Bork was concerned that conferring standing
upon legislator plaintiffs would expand the judiciary's role 69
beyond the limitations imposed by Article III and other judicial
restraint doctrines. 70 Judge Bork rejected the majority's premise
that "there must be judicial power in all cases."17'
In Moore, members of the House of Representatives sued
members of the Senate, claiming that the Senators violated Article
I, Section 7 of the Constitution when they originated the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA")' 72  The
Representatives alleged that they had been injured by the Senators'
infringement on the legislative power of the House of
Representatives to originate bills on fiscal matters. 73  The
Constitution expressly provides that revenue bills must originate in
the House of Representatives. 74  The court found that
circumvention of the constitutionally prescribed procedure created
an injury that conferred standing upon the plaintiffs.' 75 Although the
court held that it could redress the Representatives' grievances, 176
the court refused to provide a remedy because the dispute was
between members of Congress.
77
Again, the court dismissed the action through the exercise of
equitable discretion,'78 although Judge Scalia's concurring opinion
sharply criticized the majority's rationale. Judge Scalia, like Judge
separation of powers doctrine counseled against granting such a remedy. Id.
167. Id. at 1177 (Bork, J., concurring).
168. Vander Jagt, 699 E2d at 1177 (Bork, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 1178-79 (Bork, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1184 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork stated, "My colleagues'
disinclination to rest this case upon a jurisdictional ground - whether that of standing or
political question - rests squarely upon the erroneous notion, expressed in Riegle and
reiterated today, that there must be judicial power in all cases and that doctrines must not
be adopted which might frustrate that power." Id.
172. Moore, 733 F.2d at 948. Article I, section 7 requires that revenue raising bills arise
in the House of Representatives. Id.
173. Id. at 949.
174. See supra note 140.
175. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
176. Id. at 954.
177. Id. at 956 (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 955 The court stated, "In the instant case, the appellants' dispute over the
origination of TEFRA is primarily a controversy with other members of Congress... [TIhis
factor counsels restraint in the exercise of our remedial powers." Id.
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Bork in Vander Jagt, would have held that the legislators lacked
standing.179 He criticized his colleagues on the D.C. Circuit for their
repeated exercise of equitable discretion as a substitute for the
time-tested doctrines of judicial restraint.18° Furthermore, Judge
Scalia pointed out that the role of the court stops at determining
individuals' rights.18' Thus, he reasoned that although congressmen
can never have standing to sue in their official capacities because
harm is not done to them individually, the harm flows through
them to their constituents. 182
Despite these criticisms, the D.C. Circuit ruled that legislators
had standing, but invoked its equitable discretion to dismiss the
case. However, just two months prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Raines v. Byrd, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Skaggs v.
Carle'83 that twenty-seven Congressmen (among other plaintiffs)'1
4
did not have standing to challenge House Rules requiring a
three-fifths majority vote to increase federal tax rates.1 The
Representatives alleged injury because of vote dilution.186
The court proclaimed that congressmen must establish standing
by using the three-part test of Lujan.87 The court recognized that
vote dilution is an injury sufficient to confer standing.'88 Thus, the
court determined that the alleged vote dilution by the House Rules
was not real, but merely hypothetical, 18 because the Congressmen
179. Id. at 956 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180. Moore, 733 F2d at 956. Justice Scalia stated, "The chancellor's foot has never
been considered a particularly satisfactory unit of measure, even for matters of relatively
small public consequence. It is regrettable to see it applied, now for the fourth time in a
panel opinion of this court, as a substitute for the doctrine of standing in marking off the
separation of powers." Id.
181. Id. at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.)
137, 170 (1803)).
182. Id.
183. Skaggs v. Carle, 110 E3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
184. Id. at 832-33. The other plaintiffs were six of the Congressmen's constituents and
the National League of Women Voters. Id.
185. Id. at 833.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 834. See also supra notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
188. Skaggs, 110 F.3d at 834.
189. Id. at 834-36. The court held:
The appellants claim that they face imminent injury because a simple majority of the
House of Representatives cannot commit the House to raising income tax rates. We
are unpersuaded, however, that Rule XXI(5)(c) prevents a simple majority from doing
just that. At most the appellants have shown that Rule XXI(5)(c) could, under
conceivable circumstances, help to keep a majority from having its way - perhaps,
for example, because a simple majority in favor of an income tax increase might not
be prepared, for its own political reasons, to override the preference of the House
1998
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offered no evidence that a bill supported by a simple majority, but
not three-fifths majority, would fail to pass1'9 and that a simple
majority could change House Rules.191 Therefore, the three-fifths
majority provision was no more than a faqade.' 92
In his dissent, Chief Judge Edwards would have held that vote
dilution is an injury sufficient to confer standing' 93 and that the
House Rules represented a form of vote dilution.' 94 He asserted that
the existence of alternatives to judicial redress would not defeat
standing.195 In addition, the Chief Judge questioned whether the
doctrine of equitable discretion was constitutional.
196
After Skaggs, it appears that the D.C. Circuit may have
abandoned the doctrine of equitable discretion in legislator
standing cases. Furthermore, in Raines, the Supreme Court did not
address the district court's discussion of equitable discretion. Thus,
the current state of the law dictates that a legislator seeking
judicial redress will likely have a problem asserting standing.
Under the Lujan test, the Court correctly decided Raines. The
injury in alleged in Raines was Congressional passage of an
unconstitutional bill that the President executed into law.
97
However, at the time the Court decided Raines, the President had
not exercised his new power. Therefore, the Court held that the
injury was not "concrete and particularized" nor was it "actual or
imminent."
198
The Raines Court left the doors of federal courts open to
legislators who have a grievance. It is doubtful that the Supreme
Court will ever expressly close the door, as Justice (then Judge)
Scalia would have done in Moore.199 Nevertheless, postulating a
leadership against suspending or waiving the Rule in a particular instance. But that
prospect appears to be, if not purely hypothetical, neither actual or imminent.
Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 835.
192. Skaggs, 110 F.3d at 835. There may be political reasons not to change the rule. Id.
193. Id. at 838 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Edwards reasoned, "[Uinder
the precedent of this circuit, [the standing] requirements are satisfied by dilution of
appellants' votes." Id.
194. Id. at 839 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
195. Id. Chief Judge Edwards reasoned that the "possibility of alternative remedies"
rationale applied by the court arose under the court's equitable discretion (a doctrine that he
found unpersuasive) and should never be considered in a standing analysis. Id.
196. Id. at 840 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). The majority did not explicitly discuss the
doctrine of equitable discretion.
197. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2316 (1997).
198. Id. at 2322-23.
199. Moore, 733 E2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice (then Judge) Scalia stated,
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situation in which a legislator will suffer an injury that is
sufficiently is difficult "concrete and particularized" and "actual or
imminent," and has a sufficient "causal connection" to the alleged
wrong that can be redressed by a court that remains conscious of
the separation of powers doctrine.
Vote nullification may be the only injury for which a legislator
can obtain federal judicial relief.200 However, in alleged nullification
cases, the complaining legislator must prove that legislative redress
is not an option.20' Legislative redress is nearly always possible,
except perhaps when an action causes an "institutional injury."
202
Therefore, if a legislator sues claiming an injury resulting from his
voting "yea" on an appropriation bill because a certain provision
was canceled by the President, he probably cannot assert standing
successfully unless a majority of his colleagues also voted in the
same way.
2°3
Reading Raines and LIVA together, it appears that no future
legislator will be able to claim standing to overturn the enactment
of LIVA. 2°4 This leaves the Constitutional challenge to be pursued
by private citizens. However, standing has never been found based
on mere "citizenship."2 5 In an apparent attempt to calm fears
associated with this reality, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed
historical instances, in which no law was challenged, to show that
a future complainant may be able to challenge this Act.
20 6
This Line Item Veto Act violates Article I, section 7, clause 2 of
the Constitution.20 7 However, a Line Item Veto Act can be
"In my view no officers of the United States, or whatever Branch, exercise their
governmental powers as personal prerogatives in which they have a judicially cognizable
private interest. They wield those powers not as private citizens but only through the public
office which they hold." Id.
200. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
201. The vote nullification in Kennedy v. Sampson could have been redressed by the
legislature by revoting on the bill. Kennedy, 511 E2d at 438.
202. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-21. See generally Coleman v. Miller (plurality decision
concerning the standing issue).
203. LIVA provides for legislative redress in these situations.
204. Logically, Judge Scalia was correct in Moore when he found that legislators could
not asert standing in their official capacities because they acting not for themselves, but for
their constituents. Moore, 733 E2d at 958. If his constituents would fail to satisfy the
requirements for standing, the representative's claim would also fail. Id.
205. See supra note 84.
206. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2321-22. LIVA will automatically lapse in 2005 without other
action. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-92
207. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 E Supp. 25 (D. D.C. 1997). See also Raines, 117 S. Ct. at
2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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implemented constitutionally.208 By enacting this Line Item Veto Act,
Congress and the President have failed the people, but the Court
should not join in their failure by permitting legislators to challenge
laws in federal court.
The Supreme Court should not be criticized for refusing to
decide this case. To the contrary, the Court should be praised for
exercising the restraint mandated by Article HI of the United States
Constitution.
Michael J. Cremonese
.208. If not within the letter, at least within the spirit of the Constitution.
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